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{jalemany1,edelval,jalberola,agarcia}@dsic.upv.es
Universidad Politècnica de València,
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Abstract
Users are not often aware of privacy risks and disclose information in online
social networks. They do not consider the audience that will have access to it
or the risk that the information continues to spread and may reach an unex-
pected audience. Moreover, not all users have the same perception of risk. To
overcome these issues, we propose a Privacy Risk Score (PRS) that: (1) esti-
mates the reachability of an user’s sharing action based on the distance between
the user and the potential audience; (2) is described in levels to adjust to the
risk perception of individuals; (3) does not require the explicit interaction of
individuals since it considers information flows; and (4) can be approximated
by centrality metrics for scenarios where there is no access to data about infor-
mation flows. In this case, if there is access to the network structure, the results
show that global metrics such as closeness have a high degree of correlation
with PRS. Otherwise, local and social centrality metrics based on ego-networks
provide a suitable approximation to PRS. The results in real social networks
confirm that local and social centrality metrics based on degree perform well in
estimating the privacy risk of users.
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1. Introduction
The popularity of mobile devices and applications that are related to online
social networking has changed the way we communicate. People now share
their opinions, ideas, photos, etc. in online social networks (OSN) [1, 2]. When
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sharing information, users are not often aware of who will or will not have5
access to what they have just published. This uncertainty creates a risk in
the privacy of the user, which in some cases may have negative consequences
if the scope of the publication reaches people who were not in the original
audience. Applications related to OSN offer the possibility to configure options
that are related to the privacy profile of users. However, this is often a tedious10
task and is usually focused on protecting the information related to the user
profile and not to the privacy of the user’s publications [3, 4, 5]. Some works
try to address these issues with the automation of privacy settings [6, 7, 8, 9].
However, these proposals usually require an initial intervention by the user and
do not solve the problem of increasing privacy awareness. Other approaches deal15
with the improvement of the awareness of users regarding the misalignment of
users’ expected audience with the actual audience [10, 11, 12]. However, these
approaches do not deal with the problem that a publication might produce if
the expected audience performs sharing actions among their contacts. Assuming
this scenario, there is still a potential privacy risk that should be considered.20
The topological location of a user in a network is one of the main factors
that influences the scope that a certain sharing action can reach [13]. The
scope of a sharing action can be seen as the effect of a diffusion process. In the
area of Complex Networks, spreading processes such as epidemics or informa-
tion diffusion have been analyzed [14, 15, 16, 17]. Several works have studied25
spreading dynamics and influential or relevant individuals in these processes
based on structural properties [18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. From the point of view of de-
termining the privacy risk associated to a user’s sharing action, it is interesting
to determine if there are influential users in the path that information follows
who increase the privacy risk score if they perform a re-sharing action. Influen-30
tial users can initiate and conduct the dissemination of a sharing action more
efficiently than “normal” users. Therefore, influential users in networks are nor-
mally more responsible for large cascades of information diffusion and contribute
to increasing the privacy risk. Traditionally, centrality metrics such as degree
[23], pagerank [20], k-core [24, 18], closeness [25], or betweenness [26, 27, 28, 29]35
2
have been used to detect these relevant users in networks [30, 21, 31].
Not all users have the same perception of risk [32, 33, 34]. On one hand,
there are some users who are more comfortable with the possibility that their
information can be seen by others and are even interested in achieving that
effect. On the other hand, there are users that have greater privacy concerns40
and prefer not to disclose information that could be seen by users beyond their
direct friends [35]. Depending on the users’ concerns, different levels of risk
perception should be considered.
In this article, we propose a Privacy Risk Score (PRS) for measuring the
privacy in social networks, which provides the following major contributions:45
• The privacy is oriented to the reachability of a user-sharing action instead
of being focused on the misalignment of the users’ expected audience with
the actual audience.
• The measure provided is not only global, but it is also adjustable to the
risk perception of each individual.50
• The PRS does not require the user to provide information explicitly since
it takes into account the paths that the publications follow in the social
network.
• We provide an estimation of this measure for those scenarios in which in-
formation related to flow paths is not available. This estimation is based55
on an analysis of the relationship between global, local, and social central-
ity metrics and the proposed measure.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents previous
approaches that are related to privacy score metrics. Section 3 exposes the
privacy risks in social networks with an example of scenario and proposes a60
solution. Section 4 describes the concept of friendship level and presents the
PRS. Section 5 describes a set of global, local, and social centrality metrics to
estimate the PRS. Section 6, presents a set of experiments that were performed
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to evaluate the suitability of centrality metrics to estimate the PRS in synthetic
and real network topologies. Finally, Section 7 presents conclusions.65
2. Related work
In the literature, there are works that try to tackle the problem of improving
the awareness of the effect of communicative actions from different perspectives.
Table 1 provides an overview of relevant contributions in this area, which are
classified according to the dimensions of focus.70
There are approaches that provide wizards to facilitate the management
of privacy profile settings. Liu et al. [3] propose a mathematical model to
estimate both the sensitivity and the visibility of information items. The model
computes the privacy score as a combination of the partial privacy scores of
each one of the user’s profile items. The privacy score considers the privacy75
settings of users with respect to their profile items as well as their positions.
A similar approach is presented by Nepali et al. [4]. They propose a social
network model, SONET, for privacy monitoring and ranking. The authors
consider a privacy risk indicator that is used to describe an entity’s privacy
exposure factor based on the known attributes (the sensitivity and visibility80
of the attribute). Shehab et al. [5] present a privacy policy recommendation
approach that is based on the idea that nearby users should have similar labels
(permissions). The approach requires users to label a small set of their friends.
These labels are propagated over the social network to provide users with privacy
policy recommendations. Fang et al. [6] present a privacy wizard that considers85
previous labelling processes of friends as the input for their classifier. The
wizard then infers labels for the other remaining friends. Vidyalakshmi et al.
[7] present a framework for calculating a privacy score metric considering users’
personal attitude towards privacy and communication information. Bilogrevic et
al. [8] propose an information-sharing system that decides (semi-)automatically90
whether to share information with others. They consider a vector that encodes
whether or not the information is shared based on user decisions, and then a
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logistic classifier makes the remaining decisions. These approaches require user
intervention and assume that users are privacy aware of the consequences of
their decisions. They are focused on a local view of the social network and do95
not evaluate other collateral effects such as information diffusion processes.
Some approaches focus on providing information about which people have or
may have received information that was not addressed to them initially. These
works help them to increase their privacy risk awareness and better define their
social groups more carefully. Calikli et al. [10] propose an adaptive architecture100
that provides sharing recommendations to users as well as assisting them to re-
configure the users’ groups. Their proposal is based on social contexts and
conflicts. This approach depends on the provision of accurate user’s social
contexts and conflict rules. Kafali et al. [11] provide an approach that is based
on model checking that checks whether certain properties hold. The system uses105
as input privacy agreements of the users, user relations, the content they upload
as well as some inference rules. The system specifies whether the property of
interest can or cannot be violated in a given social network. Mester et. al [12]
developed a platform where agents interact to reach a consensus on a post to
be published. The agent is aware of the user’s privacy concerns, expectations,110
and the user’s friends. When a user is about to post new content, the agent
reasons on behalf of the user to decide which other users would be affected by
the post and contacts those users’ agents. However, the privacy concerns of a
user should be predefined. Yang et al. [36] present a privacy metric of user i
sharing information with a neighbor j as a trade-off between user i’s concerns115
and incentives of sharing information with j. They present privacy risk as an
individual metric, without considering other potential users that might re-share
information.
From our point of view, privacy risk does not only concern the problem that
information might reach people who were initially not expected to receive it.120
Assuming that people who received the information are part of the target au-
dience, it must also be taken into account that there is still a problem if one











Liu et al. [3] X X
Nepali et al. [4] X X
Shehab et al. [5] X
Fang et al. [6] X X
Vidyalakshmi et al. [7] X X
Bilogrevic et al. [8] X X
Calikli et al. [10] X
Kafali et al. [11] X X
Mester et al. [12] X
Yang et al. [36] X
Our work X X
Table 1: Overview of approaches related to privacy in social networks. We considered three
main features: (i) the type of information considered to evaluate the user’s privacy risk (i.e.,
the user’s profile items or actions). In the case that the approach considers actions, the goal
can be to determine if the information shared was received by the intended audience or to
estimate the reachability of the information; (ii) if the approach requires user intervention as
input for the privacy risk estimation; and (iii) if the approach provides a privacy risk metric
to the user.
loses control over the scope of the information. For this reason, it is important
to consider the privacy problem from a network perspective instead of individ-125
uals alone. The audience that is allowed see the information that a user pub-
lishes is influenced by the structure of the social network. Network models that
mimic the patterns of connection in real networks (i.e., Erdös-Rényi [37, 38, 39],
Barabási-Albert [40, 41], and Watts-Strogatz [42, 43]) facilitate the analysis of
the implications of those patterns [44]. Small-world, Scale-free, and Random130
models are very common structures in social networks. The Small-world model
is characterized by the transitivity in strong social ties and the ability of weak
ties to reach across clusters. The Scale-free model exhibits a power-law degree
distribution where there is a small set of vertices with a degree that greatly
exceeds the average. The random model assigns equal probability to all graphs135
with exactly the same number of edges.
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In this paper, we deal with this problem with the proposal of a Privacy Risk
Score (PRS) that is focused on the risk of potential re-sharing actions from the
expected and unexpected audience that might receive the message. The main
contributions of this work are the following: (i) the proposed PRS metric con-140
siders the paths that information follows as a result of sharing actions without
the user’s intervention; (ii) the calculation of the PRS metric for different users’
risk perceptions; (iii) we provide and evaluate a set of centrality metrics to es-
timate PRS values in scenarios where there is a lack of a global view of the
network and/or data about the users’ sharing activity.145
3. Privacy risk scenario
Privacy risk not only concerns the problem that information might reach
people who were initially not expected to receive it, but it also involves the
problem of losing control over the scope of the information. In Figure 1, we
describe this privacy risk problem in online social networks.150
The social network is structured into nine communities (see Figure 1a).
Nodes represent users and the node color corresponds to a community. Gray
nodes represent isolated users (i.e., they do not belong to any community). In
Figure 1b, the user represented by the node encircled in red shares a message on
his/her wall. The user determines the audience depending on his/her selected155
privacy policy (e.g., friends). Therefore, only their friends can see the message
(see Figure 1c, nodes encircled in green). If a node encircled in green performs
a sharing action, the message could reach other communities causing a privacy
problem.
The Privacy Risk Score metric proposed in this paper deals with this problem160
by providing information about the potential privacy risk of an action. The PRS
aims to increase the users’ awareness about the reachability of their publications
in the social network even though they have restricted the visibility of their
publications. Figure 2 shows the workflow phases for calculating the PRS. First,
the activity in the social network is monitorized (specifically, the path followed165
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(a) A social network structured into com-
munities.
(b) Sharing action initiated by the node
encircled in red.
(c) Potential audience in level 2.
Figure 1: Example of a potential privacy risk in online social networks.
by user messages). This information is used to establish the reachability of the
actions performed by each user and to calculate the PRS value. Then, when a
user is going to post a message, the PRS values analyzed until that moment are
shown to the user. The PRS of a user would provide him/her with an estimation
of the visibility of an action at different levels of friendship or in general. By170
taking into account their privacy risk perception and their PRS, users could













Figure 2: Flow chart of the phases for calculating the PRS in a social network.
4. Privacy Risk Score (PRS)
To define how our proposed PRS metric works, first we are going to explain
some important concepts. We assume that there is a social network G that
consists of N nodes, where every node ai ∈ {a1, ..., an} represents an agent (i.e.,
a user of the social network). Agents are connected through links that represent
friendship relationships and correspond to the edges E ⊆ N × N of G. We
assume that friendship links are bidirectional, and, therefore, the social network
is undirected. We define the adjacency matrix A to represent these links. Given
two agents ai and aj , if there is a link between these agents, we represent this
as Aai,aj = 1 and Aai,aj = 0 if there is not a link. Considering an agent ai, we
define a level L as the subset of agents whose shortest distance to ai is l:
Lai(l) ⊆ N, ∀aj ∈ Lai(l) : d(ai, aj) = l ∧ @d′(ai, aj) < d(ai, aj)
We define the Privacy Risk Score (PRS) for an agent ai that performs a
message diffusion action (i.e., publishes a message m on its wall, comments on175
an existing post, shares a post, etc.) as an indicator of the potential risk of this
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message to be diffused over the social network (i.e., potential visibility). The
higher the PRS value, the higher the threat to agent ai’s privacy.
4.1. Calculation of the PRS metric
In a social network G, there is a set of paths that messages follow more180
frequently than others [45, 46]. If an agent is in these paths and performs a
diffusion action, it has a higher privacy risk than another agent that is out
of these paths. Therefore, an agent’s position in the network is relevant to the
privacy risk. Furthermore, not all users have the same view of risk when sharing
information. As an example, some users may consider that sharing information185
with friends of friends might be risky, while others may consider that the true
risk is at the next level of friendship. Therefore, the estimation of the PRS for
an agent ai should be provided in friendship levels in order to deal with different
levels of risk perception.
In addition, according to the information diffusion model SIR (Suscepti-190
ble, Infected, and Removed) [19], the time instant in which a diffusion action
of a message is performed is also important for measuring the privacy risk.
This model states that the privacy risk related to the diffusion of a message is
higher during the initial stages than when the message has already been diffused
through the social network. In other words, the diffusion risk of a message is195
higher when an agent diffuses a new message since no other agents have viewed it
yet. Therefore, the calculation of the PRS also includes the stage of the message
in which an agent ai interacts as a diffusion action. To represent this, we define
T = {1, 2, . . . , n} as the stages of the message, which are the product of the
diffusion process of the message. This variable is represented for each message200
and indicates the number of steps from its creation. The value of the variable T
(and also of the variable L) is limited by the network diameter. Therefore, if its
value is not too high, the network diameter is a good approximation of T and
L. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that an agent can carry out a single
message diffusion action (i.e., re-share a message, comment on a message, etc.),205
allowing other agents to see this message at that time instant.
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Considering the above two factors (friendship level and risk of initial stages),
we define a T ×N reachability matrix γi associated to each agent ai to represent
the number of messages that an agent ai has diffused in a certain stage t and
have been seen by other agents. The rows of this matrix represent the diffusion210
actions that ai carries out over messages in the same stage, while columns
represent the agents of the social network. We use γit,aj to refer to the entry in
the tth row and ajth column of γi. This value represents the number of messages
diffused by ai in stage t that were seen by aj . Note that the aith column of
each row t (γit,ai ) represents the messages diffused by ai in stage t that were215
seen by ai (i.e., all of the messages published by ai in t).
Given a stage t and a set of agents of level l, we define p(ai, t, l) as the
average number of agents of this level that saw a message published by ai in
stage t:






Taking into account the above value, we estimate the PRS for an agent ai
at level l as the percentage of agents of that level that potentially see a message











In a general view, by taking into account the whole population of the social
network G, we can estimate a general value of PRS for an agent ai as the per-
centage of agents of the social network that potentially see a message published










γit,ai · |N |
 (3)
Figure 3 shows a scenario where the privacy risk score is calculated for agent
a1 in a social network. This scenario represents an example of a social network
with interactions between agents. We assume that all of the agents in G have the
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privacy policy that only their direct friends can see their walls. As indicated in220
the definition above, the maximum value for parameters T and L cannot exceed
the network diameter. Therefore, for this example of PRS calculation, we use
the value 3 for parameters T and L.
– PRS metric of agent a1:
p(a1, t = 1, l = 1) = 4/2 = 2
p(a1, t = 1, l = 2) = 5/2
p(a1, t = 1, l = 3) = 1/2
PRS(a1, l = 1) = 1/3 ⇤ 2/2 = 1/3
PRS(a1, l = 2) = 1/3 ⇤ (5/2)/5 = 1/6
PRS(a1, l = 3) = 1/3 ⇤ (1/2)/1 = 1/6
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Figure 3: Example of social network activity and the PRS calculation process. The activities
carried out on the social network are as follows (in this example, all agents share information
with their friends): (1) agent a1 publishes/shares a message m1 on its wall; (2) agent a3 shares
the message m1; (3) agent a8 shares the message m1; and (4) agent a1 publishes/shares a
new message m2.
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The message diffusion actions performed in this scenario are the following.
(1) Agent a1 publishes a message m1 on its wall. Therefore, agents a2 and a3225
can see the message. Since the interaction of agent a1 with the message m1 is in
its initial stage, stage t is 1. The information about the agents that can see m1
is stored in γ1. (2) Agent a3 then decides to share m1 on its wall. Agents a4,
a5, a6, a7, and a8 can see message m1. As in the previous case, the information
about the agents that can see message m1 is updated in γ3. The interaction of230
agent a3 with message m1 occurs after agent a1 shares it (i.e., the interaction
is produced in the next stage t = 2). Note that the values of γ1 are updated at
t = 1 because agent a1 interacts with the message in this stage, and in γ1 we
are measuring the reachability of the messages when agent a1 interacts with it.
(3) Agent a8 then shares m1 publishing it on its wall. Agents a3 and a9 can235
see it. Therefore, γ8 is updated at t = 3, and γ1 and γ3 are updated in their
corresponding t’s (i.e., t = 1 and t = 2). (4) Agent a1 then publishes a new
message m2 that agents a2 and a3 can see at stage t = 1. Then, γ1 is updated
at t = 1.
With the information stored in the γ matrix, the proposed PRS is calculated240
for each agent. In the scenario described in Figure 3, we show the values of
PRS for agent a1 at different levels (i.e., PRS(a1, l = 1), PRS(a1, l = 2), and
PRS(a1, l = 3)) and the general PRS value (i.e., PRS(a1)).
4.2. PRS metric in OSN
The integration of the PRS metric in OSN must be done as a service for users.245
This privacy service will help users to manage their sensitive and non-sensitive
information and aware its scope, improving their experiences in OSN. In Figure
4, we show a block diagram of OSN where the PRS metric was included as a
service in the OSN platform layer. The diagram is composed of a User layer,
OSN Platform layer, and Privacy Risk Module. The User layer manages users250
contacts, information related to the user (e.g., profile info, posts, comments,
etc.), and setting parameters to control who has access to the information when













































Figure 4: Block diagram of the integration of PRS metric as a service in OSN.
functionality of a OSN (e.g., management of users, messaging system, etc.).
The Privacy Risk module is included as a service of the OSN Platform layer.255
This service is responsible for the PRS metric calculation.
Figure 5 shows the workflow to estimate the PRS value of an individual
agent when he performs a message sharing action in the OSN. The process
starts when an agent ai sees a publication or when he creates content for a new
publication (mj). Then, this agent evaluates the risk of sharing/publishing mj260
considering its PRS value (PRS(ai)). If the value is greater than his individual
risk threshold (θai), ai does not perform the action. Otherwise, ai shares mj ,
which in turn, could be seen by other agents. In this case, the matrix γi of ai
is updated as well as the matrices of other agents that previously participated
in the sharing process of mj .265
5. PRS and centrality metrics
Even though the PRS estimation provides accurate measurements of the
privacy risk associated to a diffusion action, this estimation requires a detailed
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Figure 5: Flowchart of the PRS calculation process.
information is not always feasible in large networks with high activity, and, in270
some scenarios, this knowledge is not even accessible. As a result, in certain
circumstances, we would require metrics that approximate PRS values in a
feasible way.
Influential users may play a critical role in paths that information follows.
If an influential user sees a publication and performs a sharing action, it is275
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more likely for the publication to reach more people. It is important to have a
reliable and efficient predictor of these nodes based on topological properties.
From the area of Complex Networks, there is no consensus on the best metric for
predicting this influence. Researchers have proposed several structural metrics
for identifying influential users [47]. According to the information they used,280
these metrics can be classified into three classes: global, local, and social [48].
Global metrics are based on structural properties that require a complete
view of the network structure to be computed. Among the global metrics,
we considered the following commonly used metrics: betweenness, closeness,
and pagerank. Betweenness metrics are based on assumptions about the paths
that information follows. Shortest-path betweenness assumes that information
is transmitted along the shortest paths. It is defined as the fraction of the








where σ(aj , ak) is the number of shortest (aj , ak)-paths, and σ(aj , ak|ai) is the
number of those paths passing through some node ai other than aj , ak.
Random-walk betweenness was proposed by Newman [49], and, instead of
considering the shortest paths, it considers the number of times a random walk
between each pair of agents passes through the agent of interest. Thus, random-







where σr(aj , ak) is the number of random (aj , ak)-paths, and σr(aj , ak|ai) is
the number of those random paths passing through some node ai other than285
aj , ak.
While betweenness centrality measures represent the degree to which an
agent is between pairs of other agents, closeness is just the inverse of the average
distance to other agents. Closeness is defined as the mean geodesic distance from
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the agent of interest to the rest of the reachable agents in the network,290
closenessi =
|N | − 1∑j=|N |−1
j=1 d(aj , ai)
, (6)
where d(aj , ai) is the shortest-path distance between aj and ai, and |N | is the
number of nodes in the network. This metric reflects the efficiency of an agent
distributing information to any agent in the network [25].
PageRank is based on the idea that an agent has a high rank if the sum
of the ranks of its neighbors are high. The ranks are calculated based on the295









where α and β are constants and kj is the degree of node j. This metric implies
a relatively low computational complexity and has been used to identify pivotal
individuals in social networks who lead to quick and wide spreading of useful300
items [20].
Global metrics can be suitable to estimate the risk of a sharing action in
the network since they capture the user’s relevance in the transmission of in-
formation and do not require data about information flows. The computation
of a global metric requires the analysis of structural properties that involve the305
consideration of the whole social network. However, in real-world scenarios,
these metrics are not always computationally affordable and information about
friendship relationships is not always accessible. Moreover, some social applica-
tions do not facilitate access to users’ information to third party applications;
therefore, it is not possible to infer the social network structure beyond the first310
level.
As an alternative, local and social metrics efficiently identify influential
agents when there is no global information about network structure and in-
formation diffusion [50]. These metrics are focused on the user’s ego networks.
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Ego networks consist of a focal agent (ego) and the agents to whom the ego is
directly connected to (these are called alters) plus the links [51]. Local metrics
such as degree and ego-betweenness only use information from the agent itself
to be computed. Degree is the simplest centrality measure and considers the




Ego-betweenness is an ego-centric method for approximating the between-
ness centrality [52]. This metric calculates the sum of the ego’s proportion
of times that the ego lies on the shortest path between each part of the al-
ters. Ego-betweenness is the sum of the reciprocal values A2i (aj , ak) such that315







Social metrics use strictly local information and topological information
from an agent’s first and second level neighbors. Social degree and Social ego-
betweenness metrics consider the sum of the local centrality metrics of neighbors



















Centrality metrics provide mechanisms to estimate the relevance of users in
information transmission processes. Influential users play a key role in informa-
tion diffusion and therefore in the increase of the privacy risk if they perform a
re-sharing action. For this reason, considering global, local, and social centrality325
metrics might be appropriate to estimate the proposed PRS when there is no
data available about information flows. Global centrality metrics can be used if
the network structure is known. If there is no access to this information, local
and social centrality metrics based on ego-networks provide metrics to estimate
the relevance of users in information transmission processes.330
6. Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the relationship between PRS values of an agent
and its centrality in the social network. The social networks considered for
the experiments can be viewed in terms of the friendship relationships and
the activities carried out by agents. We analyze the relationship between the335
structural features of the friendship layer and the privacy risk resulting from the
diffusion actions. We perform a set of experiments in different synthetic and real
networks. For the experiments in synthetic networks we use a simulation tool
to reproduce information flows in the network, and the proposed PRS metric
to measure the individual risk of users. While in real networks, how there are340
already real information flows, we only measure the PRS values of users.
6.1. Simulation environment
We based our simulation environment on the Elgg engine1 (Figure 6). Elgg
is a popular open source engine to build a wide range of social environments.
For our purpose, we required to collect message tracing information and manage345
them in matricial structures in order to calculate the PRS metric. Therefore, we
needed to extend the functionalities of Elgg in order to fulfill our requirements.
Following the Elgg policy, we extended Social Network Services by means of
1https://elgg.org/
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plug-ins. First, we developed the Privacy Risk Module following the structure
shown in Figure 4, which is a plug-in for PRS calculation according to our350
requirements. This module was focused on two different purposes: for being
used in simulations and with real users.
Second, we developed the Simulation Tool, which is a plug-in for modelling
social networks and generating activity. The Simulation Tool was designed to
use the services of the OSN (properly supported by Elgg) such as the creation355
of users and relationships, message sending, and social interactions. Users are
represented as software agents that interact among them in the OSN. Agent-
based simulation is widely used in different areas [53]. The Simulation Tool is
composed of three main components: Input Parameters, Simulator Core and
Outputs. As Input Parameters, the simulation tool allows the definition of360
the number of simulations, the network model, and the customization of agent





























































Figure 6: Block diagram of the integration of the Simulation Tool developed as a service in
the OSN.
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etc.). For modelling social network structures, we used the NetworkX2, which
is a widely tested and recommended library for research purposes in complex
networks [54, 55, 56]. The Simulator Core carries out the simulation according365
to the input parameters. Finally, Simulation Results (i.e., Privacy Risk Score
values of each agent) are stored for further analysis. These both plug-ins were
integrated into the existing Elgg engine. Since this engine is open source, these
plug-ins will be public available.
6.2. Settings370
The experiments carried out using the simulation tool use synthetic networks
generated follow three classic models: Erdös-Rényi [37] (ER, random), Barabási-
Albert [40] (BA, scale-free), and Watts-Strogatz [42] (WS, small-world). The
networks are undirected, have 1000 agents with a diameter of 5, and an average
degree of about 12 (see Table 2). The number of simulations is 400 per each375
agent. In each simulation an agent is randomly selected and the simulation
starts if the agent decides to post a message. Figure 7 shows the deliberation
process of an agent during the simulation. Each agent decides whether or not
a message diffusion action is carried out (i.e., commenting on an existing post,
sharing a post, etc.) according to his probabilities of performing each action.380
If the agent decides to perform a diffusion action, then he selects the privacy
policy for this message. In case that the message was previously received by
this agent or if the agent decides not to carry out a message diffusion action,
then, the message is not diffused by this agent. Each simulation finishes when
there is not any message diffusion action in the OSN.385
Simulation parameters are shown in Table 3. The #Simulation parameter
allows to define the simulation rounds. Network topology parameter establishes
the underlying social network structure (i.e., scale-free, random, small-world).
Diffusion action parameter allows to define the permitted actions in the simula-









Nodes 1000 1000 1000
Edges 6464 5875 6000
Density 0.01292 0.01175 0.012
Maximum degree 32 117 21
Minimum degree 3 5 7
Average degree 12.93 11.75 12.00
Assortativity 0.00077 -0.07481 -0.02096
Triangles 631 1022 1963
Diameter 5 5 5




















Deliberation process for each agent in the simulation
Figure 7: Flowchart of the agent deliberation process.
#Simulations 400× 1000 (agents)
Network topology {scale-free, random, small-world}




Table 3: Simulation parameters.
a post). Action probability parameter establishes the probability of an agent to
perform an action. Privacy threshold parameter specifies the value from which
an agent considers that an action is risky for him. Privacy policy parameter
describes the audience of an agent action (i.e., friends).
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Regarding real networks, we used PHEME dataset3 that is based on the395
dynamics of the life cycle of social media rumours on Twitter [57]. The dataset
contains 330 conversational threads. We analyzed the PRS and centrality values
of the 330 users that initiated a thread through the publication of a message.
To evaluate the relationship between the PRS and structural centrality met-
rics in synthetic and real networks, we consider message stages from 1 to 4 and400
also relationship levels from 1 to 4. The reason for the number of relationship
levels is based on the analysis presented in [13] where it is reported that most
of the cascades in reality are small.
In the next subsections, calculations about agents’ PRS based on information
sharing activities are used to find a relation with centrality metrics. In this way,405
approximations using centrality metrics would allow us to calculate agent pri-
vacy risks in scenarios where there is no access to data about social interaction,
when there is no previous activity, or when new users join the network.
6.3. PRS and global centrality metrics
In this section, we analyze whether or not there is a correlation between410
agents’ PRS (i.e., dependent variable) and their global centrality (i.e., indepen-
dent variable) in synthetic networks. Real networks were not considered in these
experiments since the global structures of the rumor networks are not available.
We considered the global centrality metrics described in Section 4: random-
walk betweenness (bet-rw), shortest-path betweenness (bet-sp), closeness, and415
pagerank. The values of centrality properties are normalized in the range [0, 1].
We used analytical regressors to estimate the dependence relationship between
centrality metrics and PRS. We considered the R2 coefficient to determine how
close the data are to the fitted regression line. In this case, values close to 1
indicate that there is a high correlation between centrality and PRS values.420




In 8, a centrality metric is analyzed in each row, and a network topology is
considered in each column. The x axis shows the values of the agents’ PRS
and the y axis shows the values of the agents’ centrality metrics. Colors rep-
resent the number of agents with certain values of PRS and centrality. The425
relationship between PRS and centrality metrics is also shown by the coefficient
of determination (R2). Due to the logarithmic behavior of the centrality metrics
(especially in the case of the scale-free network), a linear-log filter was applied
to all of the data.
First, the results reflect the variability of agents’ PRS depending on the430
type of network. The scale-free BA networks (see Figure 8 – first column) favor
higher values of PRS (close to 0.5). In contrast, in the small-world WS networks
(Figure 8 – third column), PRS does not reach 0.3. It can also be observed that
the type of network reflects the existence of different groups of agents based
on their privacy risk. As an example, in the scale-free BA networks there is a435
small group of agents with high values of PRS (i.e., values that range in the
interval [0.3, 0.5]), while the rest are distributed between 0.1 and 0.3. In the
random ER networks, there is a majority group with relatively high values (i.e.,
values between 0.25 and 0.4) and a minority with very low values of PRS. In
the small-world WS network, it can be observed that most of the agents have440
low PRS values (between 0.125 and 0.2) compared to other network topologies,
and there are two minorities: one with slightly lower PRS values and another
with slightly higher PRS values.
Second, there is a high correlation between global centrality metrics and the
PRS values (see Figure 8). The R2 value is around 0.9 in scale-free networks445
(Figure 8 – first column [bet-sp, pagerank]); 0.93 in random networks (Figure
8 – second column [closeness]); and 0.92 in small-world networks (Figure 8
– third column[closeness]). Thus, we can conclude that PRS values can be
approximated through global centrality metrics in scenarios without data about
information flows in the social network.450
Table 4 shows the relationship between PRS and global centrality metrics
for each level expressed as the R2 coefficient. Level 1 (i.e., direct neighbors) is
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Figure 8: Correlation between global centrality metrics and PRS for different social network
topologies.
not shown due to its irrelevance, since it corresponds to the agent that initiates
the activity (i.e., publishes a message). As can be seen from the results, the R2
coefficient generally decreases according to the depth of the target level, except455




closeness pagerank bet-sp bet-rw
scale-free (BA)
2 0.82 0.79 0.75 0.66
3 0.38 0.29 0.43 0.32
4 0.82 0.25 0.40 0.18
random (ER)
2 0.93 0.90 0.88 0.83
3 0.80 0.74 0.77 0.74
4 0.95 0.82 0.84 0.78
small-world (WS)
2 0.93 0.73 0.87 0.78
3 0.96 0.74 0.86 0.77
4 0.78 0.49 0.59 0.50
Table 4: Evaluation of the relation between global centrality metrics and PRS by levels for
different social network topologies.
As the results show, the estimation of PRS using global centrality metrics
yields promising results. However, as we stated in the previous section, global
centrality metrics present several limitations: their calculation requires a knowl-
edge of the whole network structure, and they suffer from performance issues460
in large networks. Moreover, a recalculation is needed when the network struc-
ture changes (i.e., when a new agent joins/leaves the network or a relationship
is created/removed). Taking into account these challenges in calculating global
centrality metrics, we examine local and social centrality metrics in the following
subsection.465
6.4. PRS, local, and social centrality metrics
In this section, we evaluate the relationship between local and social cen-
trality and PRS values in synthetic and real social networks. First, we analyze
degree centrality and the ego-betweenness centrality [52] (i.e., a local approxi-
mation of the betweenness centrality metric). Second, we analyze social degree470
and social ego-betweenness centrality. These experiments have the same settings
considered in previous experiments (subsection 6.2).
Figure 9 shows the results of the linear-log regression analysis to determine
if there is a relationship between local centrality and PRS values. Although
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Figure 9: Correlation between local centrality metrics and PRS for different social network
topologies.
ego-betweenness and degree centrality metrics rely on local data, they provide475
values in scale-free and random network topologies that can be used to provide
a fitted approximation of the PRS. Based on agents’ privacy risk, both local
metrics detect the same groups of agents that were detected with global metrics.
The R2 values obtained with local centrality metrics in some cases improve the
results provided by global centrality metrics, or these results are at least as good480
as those provided by global metrics.
Nevertheless, there are some situations where the degree or ego-betweenness
centrality of an agent can be misleading for detecting privacy risk. For instance,
an agent ai can be highly connected to other agents with a low degree of con-
nection and ai has a high PRS value. However, the message diffusion actions485
that its neighbors may perform will not have a real risk impact on its privacy.
Therefore, it would be interesting to consider not only the local centrality met-
rics of an agent, but also the centrality values of its neighbors. Hence, in the
following experiments, we evaluate the relation between social degree and social
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Figure 10: Correlation between social centrality metrics (i.e., degreesum,degree2sum,
bet-egosum, and bet-ego2sum) and PRS for small-world WS network.
ego-betweenness metrics and PRS. Specifically, we examine four measures in490
the first and second level: bet-egosum, degreesum, bet-ego2sum, and degree2sum
(see Equation 10, 11, 12, and 13). We do not consider further distance since the
majority of diffusion cascades in reality are small [13].
Figure 10 shows the results achieved with social degree and social ego-
betweenness centrality metrics for the small-world WS network. The relation-495
ship between social centrality and PRS values in scale-free and random struc-
tures is not shown since the values obtained were similar to those obtained by
using previous centrality metrics. The correlation between centrality and PRS
values in the small-world WS network improves considerably for bet-ego2sum and
degree2sum, while there is not any improvement for bet-egosum and degreesum.500
The reason for this could be that the ability to disseminate information in
level 2 (i.e., direct neighbors of neighbors) has a great impact on the final





local centralities social centralities
degree bet-ego degreesum bet-egosum degree2sum bet-ego2sum
scale-free (BA)
2 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.47 0.63 0.35
3 0.33 0.36 0.42 0.36 0.53 0.63
4 0.28 0.30 0.83 0.90 0.94 0.88
random (ER)
2 0.91 0.90 0.94 0.88 0.93 0.92
3 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.72 0.79 0.79
4 0.85 0.85 0.91 0.89 0.93 0.93
small-world (WS)
2 0.75 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.95 0.93
3 0.77 0.82 0.82 0.79 0.94 0.94
4 0.51 0.53 0.59 0.61 0.71 0.70
Table 5: Evaluation of the local and social centrality metrics correlation with PRS by levels
for different network topologies.
When analyzing the relationship between the local and social version of505
degree and ego-betweenness and the PRS values by levels (see Table 5), we detect
that local centrality metrics have a behavior similar to social centrality metrics.
In general, if we compare local centrality with social centrality metrics, we
find that the estimation of the PRS by levels improves for the three topologies,
especially for deep levels such as level 4. Finally, comparing both social and local510
centrality metrics, degree2sum obtains a slightly higher degree of correlation with
PRS by levels than the other centrality metrics.
Figure 11 shows the results obtained in real networks. Most users have low
PRS values (i.e., values in the range [0,0.2]). Social and local ego-betweenness
are not suitable to distinguish between users with high or low PRS. The degree515
of correlation is lower than 0.5 (see Figure 11 – second column). However,
social and local degree centrality metrics provide better results. Degree and
degreesum show a high degree of correlation (i.e., 0.66 with degree and 0.82 with
degreesum). The results are close to those obtained in synthetic networks, where
degree2sum obtained a high degree of correlation with PRS.520
The experiments validate the use of centrality metrics to approximate PRS
values in scenarios where there is no information about the activity generated
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Figure 11: Correlation between local (bet-ego and degree) and social (degreesum and
degree2sum) centrality metrics in rumour social networks.
in the social network. In scenarios where there is information about network
structure, global metrics such as closeness show a high degree of correlation with
PRS and PRS in levels. In scenarios where there is only local knowledge, local525
and social centrality metrics based on ego-networks also provide good results.
Specifically, local centrality metrics provide results estimating PRS values that
are just as good as those obtained with global metrics or even better in some
topologies such as scale-free networks. Social centrality metrics have also been
evaluated and the metrics that consider centrality properties based on neighbors530
of neighbors (degree2sum and bet-ego2sum) obtain the best degree of correlation
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with PRS and PRS in levels. Finally, we have tested local and social centrality
metrics to estimate PRS values with real data from rumor networks. The results
show that degree and degreesum provide the best approximation to estimate the
privacy risk of an action.535
7. Conclusions
Most privacy approaches focus on mechanisms that semi-automatically facil-
itate the definition of privacy policies to define the audience that a user expects
is going to receive the information published. However, there is still an open
problem of making users aware of the extent of sharing information on the social540
network, even if such information reaches the audience previously defined. In
this paper, we have focused on solving this problem. A measure of the privacy
risk of a user-sharing action, PRS, has been proposed based on the scope of its
dissemination in the network with the following main contributions:
• The PRS is oriented to estimating the reachability of users’ sharing ac-545
tions instead of being focused on the misalignment of their users’ expected
audience with the actual audience.
• This measure is provided globally and in levels in order to be able to adjust
to the user’s perception of risk.
• The PRS takes into account the paths that the publications follow in the550
social network without the need for the user to have to provide information
explicitly.
• Centrality metrics have proven to be good estimators in establishing an
approximation of the PRS in those social networking environments whose
detailed record of the information sharing activity in the social network is555
not available.
As shown in Section 6, despite the topological properties of the network,
centrality metrics can evaluate the user’s relevance in information transmission
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processes. We have considered global metrics (i.e., betweenness, closeness, and
pagerank) for scenarios where a complete view of the network it is available, and560
local and social measures (i.e., degree, ego-betweenness) for scenarios where you
only have a local view of the structure of the network. To evaluate the relation-
ship between these measures of centrality and the proposed measure of PRS, we
have performed a set of experiments in different topologies of synthetic networks
and in real networks of rumors. The results showed that in scenarios where there565
is information about network structure, global metrics such as closeness show a
high degree of correlation with PRS and PRS in levels. In scenarios where there
is only local knowledge, local and social centrality metrics based on ego-networks
provide a suitable approximation to PRS and PRS in levels. The results in real
social networks confirm that local and social centrality metrics based on degree570
perform well in estimating a user’s privacy risk and could be integrated in social
network applications that offer limited information access.
As future work, we plan to validate the proposed privacy risk score through
experiments in real environments. These experiments will provide feedback
about the effect of the use of PRS on user behavior in social networks. We575
also plan to evaluate different methods (i.e., numeric values, text messages,
color gradient, etc.) to show PRS values in order to inform the user about
the risk of certain actions in the network. We will also evaluate the inclusion
of new parameters (i.e., tie-strength between users, user personality, type of
content posted, etc.) that may influence the privacy risk in order to obtain580
more accurate values.
8. Acknowledgements
This work is partially supported by the Spanish Government project TIN2014-
55206-R and FPI grant BES-2015-074498.
32
References585
[1] E. Del Val, M. Rebollo, V. Botti, Does the type of event influence how user
interactions evolve on Twitter?, PloS one 10(5) (2015) 1–32.
[2] D. Christin, Privacy in mobile participatory sensing: Current trends and
future challenges, Journal of Systems and Software 116 (2016) 57 – 68.
[3] K. Liu, E. Terzi, A framework for computing the privacy scores of users in590
online social networks, ACM Transactions on Knowledge Discovery from
Data (TKDD) 5 (1) (2010) 1–6.
[4] R. K. Nepali, Y. Wang, Sonet: A social network model for privacy monitor-
ing and ranking, in: Proc. of 33rd International Conference on Distributed
Computing Systems Workshops (ICDCSW), 2013, pp. 162–166.595
[5] M. Shehab, H. Touati, Semi-supervised policy recommendation for online
social networks, in: Proc. of IEEE/ACM International Conference on Ad-
vances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM), 2012, pp. 360–
367.
[6] L. Fang, K. LeFevre, Privacy wizards for social networking sites, in: Proc.600
of the WWW, ACM, 2010, pp. 351–360.
[7] B. Vidyalakshmi, R. K. Wong, C.-H. Chi, Privacy scoring of social network
users as a service, in: SCC, IEEE, 2015, pp. 218–225.
[8] I. Bilogrevic, K. Huguenin, B. Agir, M. Jadliwala, J.-P. Hubaux, Adaptive
information-sharing for privacy-aware mobile social networks, in: Proc. of605
the Ubicomp, 2013, pp. 657–666.
[9] Z. Sun, L. Han, W. Huang, X. Wang, X. Zeng, M. Wang, H. Yan, Recom-
mender systems based on social networks, Journal of Systems and Software
99 (2015) 109 – 119.
[10] G. Calikli, M. Law, A. K. Bandara, A. Russo, L. Dickens, B. A. Price,610
A. Stuart, M. Levine, B. Nuseibeh, Privacy dynamics: Learning privacy
33
norms for social software, in: Proc. of the 11th SEAMS, ACM, 2016, pp.
47–56.
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